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Internet Appendix to 
Quid Pro Quo? What Factors Influence IPO Allocations to Investors?  
 
TIM JENKINSON, HOWARD JONES, and FELIX SUNTHEIM* 
 
 
This internet appendix contains additional information, robustness checks and analyses as 
follows: 
 
1. Survey of investment banks and investors 
Figure IA.1: Banks and buy-side investors’ view on what factors are important in 
determining IPO allocations 
 
2. Matching procedures 
Table IA.1. Matches across datasets 
Table IA2:  Regression results using the ‘narrow’ matching algorithm only 
Table IA.3:  Regression results using the ‘wide’ matching algorithm only 
 
3. Investor and bank-investor fixed effects 
Table IA.4: The determinants of allocation, timing of investor revenues, investor fixed 
effects and bank-investor fixed effects 
 
4. Profitability of Bids 
Table IA.5: Bid profitability  
 
5. Re-running the main regressions with different specifications for hot/cold IPOs 
Table IA.6: Ex-post classifications of hot/cold IPOs 
 
6. Re-running main regressions with different specifications of the investor revenue variable 
Table IA.7: Alternative specifications of the investor revenue variable 
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1. Survey of investment banks and investors 
 
As part of the FCA market study into investment and corporate banking, a survey was sent to 
investment banks and buy-side investors asking for their views on the factors that influenced IPO 
allocations. This used similar questions to those in Jenkinson and Jones (2009). The results are 
presented in Figure IA.1. 
 
 
Figure IA.1: Banks and buy-side investors’ view on what factors are important in determining IPO 
allocations. Responses of investment banks and buy-side investors to the question `Please score the factors that 
influence the allocation decision where one is unimportant to the decision and five is extremely important’. The x-
axis shows the number of responses received for each score. The survey was answered by all investment banks and a 
selection of large buy-side investors and buy-side industry organisations. 
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2. Matching procedures 
For our analysis we need to name-match investors across our different datasets and across 
IPO allocation books. To do this we use a two stage matching process. In the first stage we 
remove all special characters and correct obvious misspellings. The first stage is likely to match 
investors on an individual entity level and we refer to it as the ‘narrow’ match. In the second 
stage we first remove legal terms and geographic references and then manually match investor 
names. We refer to the second stage matching as the ‘wide’ match that will capture unique 
investors at a group level. Table IA.1 shows how many investors we match across the different 
datasets.  
 
Table A1. Matches across datasets 
Percentage of investors matched across databases. Narrow and wide matches are based on investor names.  Under 
the narrow match special characters are removed and typos, abbreviations and capital letters changed. Under the 
wide match legal terms and location information are removed. Additionally wide matches have been individually 
checked by FCA supervisors. Trade data is only available for 65 IPOs with 27,000 combined investor names. The 
percentage shown reflects this smaller sample. When there is more than one book per IPO in the sample there can be 
double counting.  
Dataset Narrow match Wide match 
Revenue data 38.89% 57.54% 
Trade data 11.65% 29.75% 
Meetings data 3.27% 12.66% 
Investor type data 44.75% 69.30% 
 
When matching investors across the different datasets, ie between IPO allocation books, 
investor revenue data, meetings data, investor type data, transaction data, we use first the narrow 
match and then the wide match for all investors that have not been matched using the narrow 
match only.  
The reason for this procedure is the following. If we used only the narrow match we 
would most likely miss matches that are economically important. For example, if Fund A of 
Asset Manager X is recorded in a book but the revenue data only record data of Asset Manager 
X, the narrow match would not capture this relationship even though it might be economically 
important. Similarly, if we used only the wide match Fund B of Asset Manager X in the 
allocations book would not be matched to Fund B in the revenues data but to its parent company 
Asset Manager X. Our two stage matching procedure is therefore a compromise between 
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matching accurately the different investors and capturing the most important economic 
relationships. 
To explore the robustness of our results to the way we match we rerun our analyses using 
only the narrow match and, separately, using only the wide match (Tables I.A2 and IA.3). Our 
analysis requires us not only to match investors from different datasets but also to identify 
investors across the allocation books. In our main analysis we do this with the wide match. 
Whenever this wide match identifies multiple investors in one book as identical we do not drop 
or consolidate them, i.e. if two investors appear as separate investors in one book but have the 
same name according to our matching algorithm we keep those investors as separate entities. We 
think that this procedure is most likely to reflect the way banks see their own investor clients 
(since they included them as separate investors in the first place). To check the robustness of our 
analysis to this assumption we consolidate bids from (wide and, separately, narrow) matched 
investors when replicating the analysis in this section. 
Table IA.2 shows the baseline regressions with a sample constructed using the narrow 
matching algorithm only, ie allocation books, investor revenues, meetings, and trade data are 
matched by names without trying to match at a wider group level. When we match investors 
across the books of different banks for the investor fixed effects and the investor-bank fixed 
effects specifications we also use the narrow matching algorithm only. If our matching algorithm 
identifies more than one investor per book as the same investor we aggregate these investors by 
adding up their demand and final allocation. 
The results are similar to those presented in the main text even though we match a much 
smaller number of investors. Signs of the investor revenue variables remain positive and 
declining in the revenue quartiles. However, significance levels are slightly lower, and the 
variables in the regression using investor-bank fixed effects are no longer significant at the 10% 
level.  
In the same way Table IA.3 shows the same regressions based on the wide matching 
algorithm only, ie we match investors across books and from books to revenue data using the 
wide match. If investors are identified as the same entity under this matching algorithm we 
aggregate their bids and allocations. Results are qualitatively unchanged from our baseline 
regressions. 
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Table IA2:  Regression results using the ‘narrow’ matching algorithm only.  
The dependent variable is normalised rationing, ie the ratio of percent allotted to percent bid. All datasets have been merged using the ‘narrow‘ matching algorithm 
only.  Largest (large) bids are in the top (second) quartile of the bid size distribution. Price sensitive bids are limit bids or step bids. Money bids are bids expressed 
in currency which are not price sensitive bids. We construct the revenue quartiles by ranking, for each book-runner and for each IPO, all investors by the revenues 
they have had with the book-runner in the year of the IPO. The revenue dummies need to be interpreted relative to the investors who did not have any revenues 
with that book-runner.  Meeting is a dummy that takes value one if the investor participated in a meeting with the issuer. Pilot fishing are meetings that took place 
before the announcement date or which were labelled as pilot fishing meetings by the investment banks. Frequent is a dummy with value one for investors that 
participated in at least 50 IPOs. One-time bidder are bidders that participated in only one IPO. Hot (cold) IPOs are below (above) the median of IPOs in the 
distribution of days till full subscription at the bottom of the range. Investor fixed effects are defined using the ‘narrow‘ matching algorithm. T-stats are given in 
parentheses based on robust standard errors clustered at the IPO level.  
 
Dependent variable: normalixed rationing 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
Hot 
(2) 
Cold 
(3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Largest 0.325*** 0.378*** 0.289*** -0.152*** -0.216*** 0.268*** -0.178*** 
 (10.74) (4.775) (11.09) (-3.069) (-3.414) (5.000) (-3.324) 
Large 0.170*** 0.168** 0.164*** -0.0606** -0.0926** 0.0970* -0.110** 
 (6.116) (2.177) (7.322) (-1.988) (-2.286) (1.960) (-2.316) 
Price sensitive bid 0.105*** 0.136** 0.0771** 0.0625*** 0.0576* 0.0949* -0.000837 
 (4.675) (2.679) (2.394) (2.869) (1.854) (1.877) (-0.0174) 
Money bid -0.0408** -0.0257 -0.0421 -0.00139 -0.0126 -0.0780* -0.0560 
 (-1.980) (-0.661) (-1.533) (-0.0666) (-0.409) (-1.785) (-1.366) 
Early -0.0477*** -0.0710 -0.0165 0.0912*** 0.0939*** -0.0804** 0.0566 
 (-2.898) (-1.658) (-1.249) (5.591) (4.686) (-2.381) (1.600) 
Revised bid 0.0562***  0.0434*** 0.0170 0.0217 0.0767* 0.0526 
 (3.308)  (2.873) (1.015) (1.024) (1.845) (1.626) 
Meeting 0.212*** 0.212** 0.182*** 0.109*** 0.140*** 0.294*** 0.127* 
 (6.174) (2.186) (4.151) (3.785) (3.526) (3.556) (1.936) 
Pilot fishing 0.343*** 0.428** 0.284*** 0.129 0.139 0.291** -0.0534 
 (3.711) (2.629) (4.463) (1.635) (1.476) (2.329) (-0.470) 
Frequent bidder -0.208*** -0.295*** -0.187***   -0.252***  
 (-11.39) (-7.291) (-7.988)   (-7.695)  
One-time bidder 0.0831*** 0.182** 0.0202   0.126  
 (2.710) (2.388) (0.810)   (1.434)  
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1st revenue quartile 0.508*** 0.712*** 0.365*** 0.110*** 0.0997 0.592*** 0.108* 
 (12.87) (7.446) (10.69) (5.100) (1.282) (7.282) (1.812) 
2nd revenue quartile 0.237*** 0.286*** 0.227*** 0.0417** 0.0154 0.327*** 0.0378 
 (8.556) (3.652) (6.984) (2.284) (0.199) (5.180) (1.057) 
3rd revenue quartile 0.0581*** 0.0450 0.0605** 0.0338* 0.0493 0.0922 0.0250 
 (2.619) (0.846) (2.388) (1.878) (0.706) (1.429) (1.036) 
4th revenue quartile -0.0909*** -0.187*** -0.0156 0.0325* 0.0532 -0.0901*** 0.0698*** 
 (-4.853) (-4.411) (-0.754) (1.855) (0.786) (-2.745) (3.098) 
Flipped      0.0314 0.0428 
      (0.527) (0.774) 
Topped up      0.171*** -0.0407 
      (3.327) (-0.440) 
Liquidity provision      0.142*** 0.164 
      (2.701) (1.543) 
Constant 0.516*** 0.522*** 0.609*** 1.076*** 0.967*** 0.521*** 0.637*** 
 (23.68) (14.01) (20.48) (21.62) (16.23) (9.227) (5.758) 
        
Observations 51,296 15,650 19,202 51,296 51,296 11,991 11,991 
R-squared 0.081 0.059 0.155 0.652 0.758 0.104 0.772 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes no yes yes 
IPO fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
investor fixed effects no no no yes no no yes 
Investor-bank fixed effects no no no no yes no no 
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Table IA.3:  Regression results using the ‘wide’ matching algorithm only.  
The dependent variable is normalised rationing, ie the ratio of percent allotted to percent bid. All datasets have been merged using the `wide‘ matching algorithm 
only.  Largest (large) bids are in the top (second) quartile of the bid size distribution. Price sensitive bids are limit bids or step bids. Money bids are bids expressed 
in currency which are not price sensitive bids. We construct the revenue quartiles by ranking, for each book-runner and for each IPO, all investors by the revenues 
they have had with the book-runner in the year of the IPO. The revenue dummies need to be interpreted relative to the investors who did not have any revenues 
with that book-runner. Meeting is a dummy that takes value one if the investor participated in a meeting with the issuer. Pilot fishing are meetings that took place 
before the announcement date or which were labelled as pilot fishing meetings by the investment banks. Frequent is a dummy with value one for investors that 
participated in at least 50 IPOs. One time bidder are bidders that participated in only one IPO. Hot (cold) IPOs are below (above) the median of IPOs in the 
distribution of days till full subscription at the bottom of the range. Investor fixed effects are defined using the ‘wide‘ matching algorithm. T-stats are given in 
parentheses based on robust standard errors clustered at the IPO level.  
 
Dependent variable: normalized rationing 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
Hot 
(2) 
Cold 
(3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Largest 0.226*** 0.194** 0.257*** -0.131*** -0.167*** 0.193*** -0.150** 
 (7.482) (2.437) (9.129) (-2.686) (-2.677) (3.826) (-2.659) 
Large 0.122*** 0.0762 0.155*** -0.0514 -0.0705* 0.0537 -0.0961* 
 (4.378) (0.988) (6.587) (-1.644) (-1.759) (1.110) (-1.840) 
Price sensitive bid 0.108*** 0.136** 0.0810*** 0.0742*** 0.0758*** 0.123*** 0.0804* 
 (5.018) (2.700) (2.642) (3.631) (2.840) (3.026) (1.969) 
Money bid -0.0132 0.0158 -0.0262 0.00327 0.00304 -0.0202 -0.00641 
 (-0.646) (0.360) (-0.958) (0.153) (0.107) (-0.544) (-0.184) 
Early -0.0463*** -0.0891** -0.0128 0.0791*** 0.0820*** -0.0713** 0.0764** 
 (-2.936) (-2.561) (-0.869) (4.790) (4.046) (-2.093) (2.279) 
Revised bid 0.0366**  0.0365** 0.0254* 0.0237 0.0343 0.0384 
 (2.590)  (2.607) (1.894) (1.423) (1.040) (1.116) 
Meeting 0.235*** 0.298*** 0.155*** 0.115*** 0.160*** 0.240*** 0.0359 
 (10.70) (5.849) (5.665) (6.311) (5.626) (5.309) (0.964) 
Pilot fishing 0.255*** 0.425*** 0.168*** 0.101** 0.0885* 0.182** -0.0294 
 (3.528) (2.860) (3.097) (2.108) (1.801) (2.511) (-0.509) 
Frequent bidder 0.0931*** 0.169*** 0.0509***   0.0202  
 (5.333) (3.211) (3.382)   (0.781)  
One-time bidder 0.170*** 0.287** 0.0641**   0.162**  
 (3.523) (2.489) (2.142)   (2.143)  
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1st revenue quartile 0.372*** 0.534*** 0.218*** 0.0515** 0.0943* 0.377*** 0.0525 
 (11.57) (8.316) (8.920) (2.596) (1.827) (6.308) (1.544) 
2nd revenue quartile 0.208*** 0.306*** 0.119*** 0.0312* 0.0646 0.226*** 0.0150 
 (7.817) (5.268) (4.841) (1.874) (1.269) (4.690) (0.520) 
3rd revenue quartile 0.0619*** 0.0648 0.0328 0.0168 0.00518 0.0324 0.0229 
 (3.129) (1.625) (1.556) (1.207) (0.130) (0.581) (0.914) 
4th revenue quartile -0.0257 -0.0331 -0.0372* 0.0211 0.0252 -0.0715* 0.0231 
 (-1.314) (-0.716) (-1.811) (1.502) (0.681) (-1.880) (1.095) 
Flipped      0.195*** 0.121*** 
      (3.844) (2.965) 
Topped up      0.395*** 0.00442 
      (8.127) (0.0944) 
Liquidity provision      -0.0212 -0.130 
      (-0.401) (-1.543) 
Constant 0.520*** 0.493*** 0.603*** 1.031*** 0.923*** 0.530*** 0.356*** 
 (21.24) (10.42) (20.80) (23.39) (16.94) (10.77) (4.671) 
        
Observations 49,216 14,918 18,496 49,216 49,216 11,799 11,799 
R-squared 0.092 0.070 0.158 0.561 0.690 0.120 0.640 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes no yes yes 
IPO fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
investor fixed effects no no no yes no no yes 
Investor-bank fixed effects no no no no yes no no 
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3. Investor and bank-investor fixed effects 
Investor fixed effects control for any drivers of normalized rationing that are constant for 
a given investor across different IPOs and banks. Examples might include providing particularly 
useful views on valuation on all IPOs, or being a large investor. The investor fixed effects filter 
out this investor-specific effect, and so the coefficients capture only the characteristics that differ 
for the same investor from one IPO to another. For instance, having included investor fixed 
effects, the revenue variables will only capture the impact of variations in revenue quartiles 
across IPOs. If an investor is in the top revenue quartile for every IPO, this characteristic will be 
filtered out by the fixed effect. Therefore, the results need to be interpreted carefully. 
The results for models including investor fixed effects are shown in column one of Table 
IA.4. The R-squared of the regression increases by about 40 percentage points compared with 
baseline regression, ie 40% of the variation in normalized rationing is driven by characteristics 
specific to an investor.1 The bid-size quartile dummies are negative in contrast to the regressions 
without investor fixed effects, but only the coefficient for the largest bid-size quartile is 
statistically significant. This can be interpreted as follows: holding investor size constant (using 
the fixed effects) the additional impact of putting in a very large bid is actually negative and such 
large bids (by that investor) are penalized.  
Turning to the investor revenue variables, we still see a positive and, except for the third 
quartile, significant relationship with normalized rationing when including investor fixed effects. 
The size of the coefficients declines by revenue quartile which is again consistent with larger 
revenues being associated with more favorable allocation. Overall the effects are smaller than in 
the regressions without fixed effects, which is to be expected since the revenue coefficients in 
this specification only capture the variation in revenue quartiles across IPOs. These results 
reinforce the earlier findings, as they demonstrate that for a given investor (whether helpful, coy, 
large, small, long-only or renowned flipper) their varying revenue relationships across IPOs 
affects their allocation. 
                                                
1 Note however that investor fixed effects also capture investor characteristics like being an informative investor or a 
high revenue investor. 
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While investor fixed effects control for investor characteristics that are common to one 
investor across multiple IPOs with different banks, they do not control for characteristics which 
are peculiar to the relationship between one investor and one particular bank. For example an 
investment bank which has a good relationship with an investor may be better able to predict 
whether that investor will be a long-term holder of the stock in a given IPO and therefore decide 
to allocate more shares to such an investor. One reason for that relationship could be that the 
investor is a long-standing, active broking client of the bank.  
If this were the case our regressions would lack a variable that measures the depth of the 
relationship and we could interpret the correlation between revenues and normalized rationing as 
evidence for banks favoring clients with whom they have a deep relationship. We already 
include some variables that may proxy for this investor-bank relationship and its outcomes, e.g. 
whether the investor is a frequent participant in the IPO market, participates in meetings, or 
submits informative bids. However, as a further robustness check we re-run our baseline 
regressions including bank-investor fixed effects, i.e. we restrict the regression model to 
variation within investor-bank pairs. That means that the coefficient will capture only the 
different revenue quartile position of an investor in different IPOs run by the same bank. For 
example, an investor that is active in two IPOs run by the same bank may be in the top revenue 
quartile in the first IPO (alongside many low revenue investors) but in the bottom quartile in the 
second IPO (alongside many other high revenue investors).  
The results of this regression are shown in column four of Table IA.4. Even under this 
very demanding test the top two revenue quartile variables are still significant, positive, and 
increasing in revenues, implying that an investor who participates in different IPOs with one 
bank will receive a higher allocation in the IPO in which it is more important to the bank in 
revenue terms. 
To conclude, even after controlling for any omitted investor-specific and investor-bank-
specific effects, higher revenues are associated with higher normalized rationing.  
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Table IA.4: The determinants of allocation, timing of investor revenues, investor fixed 
effects and bank-investor fixed effects 
The dependent variable is normalised rationing, ie the ratio of percent allotted to percent bid. Largest (large) bids are in the top 
(second) quartile of the bid size distribution. Price sensitive bids are limit bids or step bids. Money bids are bids expressed in 
currency which are not price sensitive bids. We construct the revenue quartiles by ranking, for each book-runner and for each 
IPO, all investors by the revenues they have had with the book-runner in the year of the IPO, in the year before the IPO or in the 
year after the IPO. The revenue dummies need to be interpreted relative to the investors who did not have any revenues with that 
book-runner. Meeting is a dummy that takes value one if investor participated in a meeting with the issuer. Pilot fishing refers to 
meetings that took place before the announcement date or which were labelled as pilot fishing meetings by the investment banks. 
One-time bidders are bidders that participated in only one IPO. Investor fixed effects and investor-bank fixed effects are defined 
using the ‘wide’ matching algorithm. T-stats are given in parentheses based on robust standard errors clustered at the IPO level. 
 Dependent variable: normalised rationing 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Largest -0.138*** -0.0650* -0.198** -0.174** 
 (-2.665) (-1.824) (-2.509) (-2.597) 
Large -0.0529 -0.0211 -0.119** -0.0720* 
 (-1.524) (-0.758) (-2.446) (-1.672) 
Price sensitive bid 0.0529* 0.0466 -0.00569 0.0515 
 (1.837) (1.528) (-0.164) (1.366) 
Money bid -0.0224 -0.0312 -0.0841** -0.0305 
 (-0.679) (-0.878) (-2.479) (-0.717) 
Early 0.0685*** 0.0717*** 0.0760*** 0.0671*** 
 (3.488) (3.594) (2.970) (2.642) 
Revised bid 0.0115 0.00607 0.0407** 0.00859 
 (0.417) (0.201) (2.415) (0.248) 
Meeting 0.106*** 0.135*** 0.0896*** 0.142*** 
 (5.773) (6.539) (3.279) (5.638) 
Pilot fishing 0.0928*** 0.144*** 0.0340 0.0904** 
 (2.758) (4.824) (0.824) (2.186) 
1st revenue quartile (IPO year) 0.133***   0.179*** 
 (5.093)   (3.243) 
2nd revenue quartile (IPO year) 0.0677***   0.0953** 
 (2.955)   (2.104) 
3rd revenue quartile (IPO year) 0.0236   0.0327 
 (1.409)   (0.764) 
4th revenue quartile (IPO year) 0.0347*   0.0376 
 (1.859)   (0.658) 
1st revenue quartile (IPO year-1)  0.141***   
  (3.082)   
2nd revenue quartile (IPO year-1)  0.0598***   
  (2.920)   
3rd revenue quartile (IPO year-1)  0.0274   
  (1.245)   
4th revenue quartile (IPO year-1)  0.0413*   
  (1.969)   
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Table IA.4: The determinants of allocation, timing of investor revenues, investor fixed 
effects and bank-investor fixed effects (cont.) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
1st revenue quartile (IPO year+1)  0.125***   
  (4.759)   
2nd revenue quartile (IPO year+1)  0.0602***   
  (2.913)   
3rd revenue quartile (IPO year+1)  0.0144   
  (0.765)   
4th revenue quartile (IPO year+1)  0.0263   
  (1.467)   
Constant 1.079*** 1.003*** 1.190*** 0.961*** 
 (22.13) (22.27) (18.36) (16.04) 
     
Observations 52,199 48,704 33,715 52,199 
R-squared 0.498 0.498 0.551 0.612 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes no 
IPO fixed effects yes yes yes no 
investor fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
investor-bank fixed effects no no no yes 
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4. Profitability of bids 
Table IA.5 shows the results of a regression of bid profitability on control variables and 
the investor revenue variables. The first column, the baseline regression with bank and IPO fixed 
effects, shows that high revenue investors make more profitable bidding decisions. The only 
other significant variable is bid size, i.e. those clients who have a lot of broking revenue with the 
book-runners and those who place large bids make the most profitable bids.  
When we introduce investor fixed effects in the second column of Table IA.5 the revenue 
variables turn insignificant, i.e. while investors with high broking revenues receive more 
profitable bids than others, this relationship seems to be specific to some investors rather than 
applying to all investors. In column three we try to understand better which investor types place 
the more profitable bids. Bids by hedge funds are less profitable than bids by long-only investors 
or other types of investors, reflecting the higher scale back that hedge funds receive compared to 
long-only investors (Table 5). However, the revenue variables remain positive and significant, i.e. 
our results are not driven by one of the investor types having high revenues with banks and 
receiving the most profitable bids. 
To sum up, it seems that some investors are consistently able to place profitable bids and 
that these investors also generate high brokerage revenues for the banks. It is important to note 
that profitability of bids does not only depend on the scale-back an investor receives but also on 
the investor’s ability to predict the market price of the IPO shares, a variable that is unknown to 
all participants. 
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Table IA.5: Bid profitability  
The dependent variable is bid profitability, ie the ratio of shares allocated to shares bid for times the return in the 
first day of trading compared to the offer price. Largest (large) bids are in the top (second) quartile of the bid size 
distribution. Price sensitive bids are limit bids or step bids. Money bids are bids expressed in currency which are not 
price sensitive bids. We construct the revenue quartiles by ranking, for each book-runner and for each IPO, all 
investors by the revenues they have had with the book-runner in the year of the IPO. The revenue dummies need to 
be interpreted relative to the investors who did not have any revenues with that book-runner. Meeting is a dummy 
that takes value one if investor participated in a meeting with the issuer. Pilot fishing refer to meetings that took 
place before the announcement date or which were labelled as pilot fishing meetings by the investment banks. 
Frequent is a dummy with value one for investors that participated in at least 50 IPOs. Investors are classified using 
the ‘wide’ matching algorithm. T-stats are given in parentheses based on robust standard errors clustered at the IPO 
level. 
 Dependent variable: bid profitability 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) 
Largest 0.235*** -0.141 0.283*** 
 (2.706) (-1.186) (2.996) 
Large 0.0983 -0.137* 0.120* 
 (1.476) (-1.824) (1.727) 
Price sensitive bid -0.0926 -0.251* -0.0681 
 (-0.616) (-1.672) (-0.448) 
Money bid -0.101 -0.0735 -0.0608 
 (-1.487) (-1.039) (-0.846) 
Early 0.00342 0.123** 0.0216 
 (0.0840) (2.197) (0.531) 
Revised bid 0.0701 0.130 0.0322 
 (0.859) (1.599) (0.419) 
Meeting 0.125 -0.0467 0.120 
 (1.199) (-0.447) (1.151) 
Pilot fishing 0.156 0.0352 0.132 
 (0.824) (0.181) (0.696) 
Frequent bidder -0.0130  0.00369 
 (-0.239)  (0.0695) 
Hedge fund   -0.190*** 
   (-2.923) 
Long only   0.407** 
   (2.607) 
1st revenue quartile 0.376*** 0.0686 0.343*** 
 (3.613) (0.609) (3.251) 
2nd revenue quartile 0.212*** 0.0414 0.202** 
 (2.634) (0.534) (2.480) 
3rd revenue quartile -0.0423 -0.0565 -0.0272 
 (-0.616) (-0.914) (-0.399) 
4th revenue quartile -0.140** -0.0775 -0.107* 
 (-2.067) (-1.330) (-1.699) 
Constant -2.145* -2.195*** -2.224* 
 (-1.892) (-4.671) (-1.958) 
Observations 44,437 44,437 44,437 
R-squared 0.049 0.356 0.055 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes 
IPO fixed effects no no no 
Investor fixed effects no yes no 
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5. Ex-post classifications of hot/cold IPOs  
We defined ex-ante ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ IPOs according to whether full subscription at the 
lower end of the initial price range was achieved more quickly or more slowly than the median 
(in terms of days). In Table IA6 we explore alternative definitions of ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ IPOs: by 
segmenting the sample by the (ultimate) level of oversubscription, and by the level of ex-post 
IPO performance. Oversubscription is the level of subscription at the offer price and IPO 
performance is the return compared to the offer price after one week of trading. We split the 
sample at the median. Results are qualitatively similar to those using our ‘time to full 
subscription’.  
 
 
 
Table IA.6: Ex-post classifications of hot/cold IPOs 
The dependent variable is normalised rationing, i.e. the ratio of percent allotted to percent bid. Largest (large) bids 
are in the top (second) quartile of the bid size distribution. Price sensitive bids are limit bids or step bids. Money 
bids are bids expressed in currency which are not price sensitive bids. We construct the revenue quartiles by ranking, 
for each book-runner and for each IPO, all investors by the revenues they have had with the book-runner in the year 
of the IPO. The revenue dummies need to be interpreted relative to the investors who did not have any revenues with 
that book-runner.  Meeting is a dummy that takes value one if the investor participated in a meeting with the issuer. 
Pilot fishing are meetings that took place before the announcement date or which were labelled as pilot fishing 
meetings by the investment banks. Frequent bidder is a dummy with value one for investors that participated in at 
least 50 IPOs. One-time bidder are bidders that participated in only one IPO. In columns (1) and (2) Hot (Cold) IPOs 
are below (above) the median of IPOs in the distribution of days till full subscription at the bottom of the range. In 
columns (3) and (4) we split the sample at the median ex-post return, meausred at the end of the first trading day. 
Investors are classified using the ‘wide’ matching algorithm. T-stats are given in parentheses based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the IPO level.  
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 Dependent variable: normalized rationing 
VARIABLES 
Above median 
oversubscription 
(1) 
Below median 
oversubscription 
(2) 
Above median IPO 
return 
(3) 
Below median IPO 
return 
(4) 
Largest 0.162*** 0.240*** 0.189*** 0.195*** 
 (3.462) (9.485) (4.087) (5.800) 
Large 0.113*** 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.117*** 
 (2.954) (5.529) (2.968) (4.722) 
Price sensitive bid 0.0903** 0.0456** 0.0742* 0.0686*** 
 (2.304) (2.461) (1.829) (3.115) 
Money bid -0.0545 -0.0217 -0.0540 -0.0318 
 (-1.150) (-1.002) (-1.045) (-1.457) 
Early -0.0208 -0.0460*** -0.0261 -0.0252* 
 (-0.409) (-3.115) (-0.509) (-1.705) 
Revised bid -0.00662 0.0399*** -0.00481 0.0499*** 
 (-0.170) (3.625) (-0.123) (3.699) 
Meeting 0.280*** 0.125*** 0.233*** 0.242*** 
 (10.25) (6.364) (8.230) (9.129) 
Pilot fishing 0.322*** 0.0568* 0.278*** 0.180** 
 (4.745) (1.795) (3.803) (2.127) 
One time bidder 0.218*** 0.0460 0.196*** 0.103 
 (2.908) (1.609) (2.907) (1.392) 
Frequent bidder 0.115*** 0.000673 0.0869*** 0.0605 
 (3.450) (0.0428) (2.836) (1.643) 
1st revenue quartile 0.634*** 0.202*** 0.582*** 0.365*** 
 (9.074) (6.791) (8.141) (5.587) 
2nd revenue quartile 0.335*** 0.123*** 0.315*** 0.177*** 
 (6.834) (5.915) (6.232) (5.589) 
3rd revenue quartile 0.117*** 0.0424** 0.0927** 0.0963*** 
 (3.314) (2.442) (2.572) (3.790) 
4th revenue quartile -0.0182 -0.0103 -0.0233 -0.00499 
 (-0.587) (-0.578) (-0.750) (-0.202) 
Constant 0.331*** 0.641*** 0.400*** 0.554*** 
 (6.030) (30.84) (6.489) (17.50) 
     
Observations 36,272 15,927 35,073 17,126 
R-squared 0.084 0.216 0.080 0.118 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
IPO fixed effects yes yes yes yes 
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6. Alternative specifications of the investor revenue variable 
In Table IA.7 we test the robustness of our results to different specifications of the investor 
revenue variables. Columns one and two show results with dummy variables which take the 
value one if the investor is in the first to fourth quartile of revenues of all investors of a bank. 
That is, we sort investor revenues by bank and not by IPO since banks may only favor investors 
who are important to them in general, not just relative to the other investors in a given IPO. The 
results are very similar to those in our main analysis. In columns three and four we use 
continuous revenue variables, rather than our quartile rankings. In column three we use the share 
of revenues an investor had with an investment bank in the year of the IPO. In column four we 
use instead the total share of revenues of an investor with a bank over the full sample period. 
Both variables are significant and positive confirming our results in the main text. Throughout 
Table IA.7 we cluster standard errors at the investor level compared to clustering them at the IPO 
level as in the main analysis.2 
 
Table IA.7: Alternative specification of investor revenue variables 
The dependent variable is normalised rationing. Largest (large) bids are in the top (second) quartile of the bid size 
distribution. Price sensitive bids are limit bids or step bids. Money bids are bids expressed in currency which are not 
price sensitive bids. We construct the revenue quartiles by ranking, for each book-runner, all investors by the 
revenues they have had with the book-runner in the year of the IPO. The revenue dummies need to be interpreted 
relative to the investors who did not have any revenues with that book-runner. Revenue share in the year of the IPO 
are investor revenues divided by total revenues from all investors in the year of the IPO. Meeting is a dummy that 
takes value one if the investor participated in a meeting with the issuer. Pilot fishing are meetings that took place 
before the announcement date or which were labelled as pilot fishing meetings by the investment banks. Frequent 
bidder is a dummy with value one for investors that participated in at least 50 IPOs. One-time bidder are bidders that 
participated in only one IPO. Hot (cold) IPOs are below (above) the median of IPOs in the distribution of days till 
full subscription at the bottom of the range. Investor fixed effects are defined using the ‘wide’ matching algorithm. 
T-stats are given in parentheses based on robust standard errors clustered at the IPO level.  
 
  
                                                
2 We did run robustness checks on all regressions in this paper clustering standard errors at the investor level and the 
results remained mostly unchanged. 
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Normalised rationing 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Largest 0.193*** -0.137*** -0.137*** 0.235*** 
 (7.052) (-4.682) (-4.655) (8.565) 
Large 0.116*** -0.0531** -0.0527** 0.127*** 
 (6.085) (-2.319) (-2.311) (6.962) 
Price sensitive bid 0.0678* 0.0524* 0.0534* 0.0596* 
 (1.957) (1.671) (1.698) (1.838) 
Money bid -0.0507 -0.0233 -0.0224 -0.0704* 
 (-1.258) (-0.661) (-0.634) (-1.949) 
Early -0.0255 0.0686*** 0.0690*** -0.0302 
 (-0.783) (3.519) (3.528) (-1.022) 
Revised bid 0.0147 0.0119 0.0127 0.0295 
 (0.697) (0.534) (0.571) (1.503) 
Meeting 0.235*** 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.281*** 
 (8.832) (5.342) (5.530) (11.45) 
Pilot fishing 0.246*** 0.0930** 0.0940** 0.282*** 
 (4.259) (2.431) (2.450) (6.181) 
Frequent bidder 0.0817*   0.146*** 
 (1.701)   (3.044) 
One-time bidder 0.166***   0.162*** 
 (4.727)   (4.922) 
1st revenue quartile 0.475*** 0.100***   
 (8.640) (3.567)   
2nd revenue quartile 0.301*** 0.0877***   
 (7.241) (3.145)   
3rd revenue quartile 0.115*** 0.0406**   
 (4.144) (2.343)   
4th revenue quartile -0.0319 0.0272*   
 (-1.316) (1.738)   
Revenue share IPO year   0.0349***  
   (2.636)  
Total revenue share    53.95*** 
    (5.375) 
Constant (13.39) (18.07) (17.97) (13.39) 
   0.0349***  
Observations 52,199 52,199 52,199 60,210 
R-squared 0.084 0.498 0.498 0.082 
Bank fixed effects yes yes yes Yes 
IPO fixed effects yes yes yes Yes 
Investor fixed effects no yes no yes 
 
 
